

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

~~Secret~~

Executive Registry

April 10, 1962

Noted by
27 APR 1962

Dear John:

Thanks for your note of April 6th with reference to the maintenance of facilities and also for the copy of your note of April 9th on Usachev.

Your note of the 6th is very much to the point and I agree that we must keep in mind the difference between the ability of a controlled as contrasted with a free enterprise economy in getting production facilities back into operation. This Agency already has in progress some economic studies directed toward finding out what the impact would be of some degree of production by categories while producing on a limited basis for maintenance and test.

As to the Usachev situation, there is probably in the CIA files of 1958 a personal message from me to the then Director commenting on Kistiakowsky's enthusiastic report on his dinner and evening talk with Usachev. I felt then that Kistiakowsky's report was over enthusiastic and both Jack Maury and I felt that the ideas Usachev put forth were undoubtedly a plant.

I agree with you that in view of this background and in view of their usual methods, we should look with great skepticism at any current comments by Usachev.

I am not circulating any copies of this letter for obvious reasons.

Sincerely,

W. C. Foster

William C. Foster

The Honorable
John A. McCone
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY) *US Arms Control & Disarm.*

State Dept. review completed

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GROUP 1
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SUBJECT: Brief of Cables on Kistiakowsky-Usachev Conversation

1. We have been unable to locate Bill Foster's personal message mentioned in the attached letter, but it is believed that the following brief of the cables on the Kistiakowsky-Usachev conversation covers the situation as it then existed.

2. In a long private dinner conversation between Kistiakowsky and Usachev on 4 December 1958, Usachev commented that for years an asymmetric situation existed between USSR and USA due to strategic bombers, making the resolution of international problems difficult. The situation was not completely changed with missiles providing the Soviets with the upper hand, and the USA is afraid of them as the Soviets were afraid of SAC. In discussion re Soviet missile lead Usachev dismissed medium range and IRBMs as not really important. In response to the statement that the U. S. is gaining in ICBM race, Usachev became somewhat heated replying that the Soviets are at present in mass production of ICBMs (mass emphasized). When reminded of the large step from production to operational deployment, Usachev became more vehement insisting the Soviets have operational ICBM bases now in more than token number. Quote This is what brought you to Geneva and basic objective your agenda -- You want to learn where our bases are located Unquote.

3. Kistiakowsky was confident that Usachev's remarks on missiles were not a plant but unguarded remarks in heat of argument, and therefore are true. The sum total of these impressions reinforce Kistiakowsky's conviction which is now firm that ICBM conclusions of USIB and also of the Hyland Panel are grossly in error.

4. In a review of this situation, State Department advised that Usachev by far is most accessible to westerners of any Soviet delegate, apparently regularly using contacts take soundings and launch trial balloons. In view of past skill and experience in this role, doubt he could be easily provoked into indiscretion. State also suggested caution in use of this information.

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6 April 1962

✓ *and*
The Honorable William C. Foster/
Director
U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 5930 New State
21st and Virginia Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Bill:

In connection with matters at this morning's meeting, I hope that you are giving very careful consideration to the question of our position vis-a-vis the Soviets under a disarmament program with neither side restricted in the maintenance of facilities for the fabrication and assembly of military equipment. By maintaining factories intact, either idle or at a very low level of production, arrangements could be planned in a controlled society to bring the plants up to maximum production in a minimum time. I can readily envisage such a plan involving substantial inventories of fabricated and assembled components and a periodic training of personnel. This to me represents serious dimensions of the problem.

I observed this as a distinct possibility when I was in Russia two years ago and, in fact, discussed it with Professor Emelyanov and others. From them I gained the impression that under their system of central government control of both factories and workers, it would be quite possible for them to get the production lines going on an all-out basis in a very minimum time. In fact, they were unable to answer my question as to how we could protect ourselves against just such contingent planning on their part.

By contrast, our society does not seem to have the capability of doing these things. As you will recall when we were required to start up reserve plants after the outbreak of the Korean War, it proved to be both a laborious and time-consuming undertaking. I was disappointed in those days to find idle aircraft, engine, tank, and armament plants, which had been maintained for years to provide instant mobilization potential, not usable until large amounts of money had been spent and a great deal of time consumed in re-equipping, modifying, etc.

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE)

One might argue that this need not happen in our society but it does and you must find some way in your negotiations to safeguard us against such a disadvantageous position. This is a problem not dissimilar from the problem of safeguarding against secret preparation for further nuclear testing.

Signed "John"
Sincerely,

John A. McCone
Director

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